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Abstract
Shor’s quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many clas-
sical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational
problems that are believed hard even for quantum computers. However, security of these schemes against
quantum attacks is elusive. This is because existing security analysis (almost) only deals with classical
attackers and arguing security in the presence of quantum adversaries is challenging due to unique quan-
tum features such as no-cloning.
This work proposes a general framework to study which classical security proofs can be restored in
the quantum setting. Basically, we split a security proof into (a sequence of) classical security reductions,
and investigate what security reductions are “quantum-friendly”. We characterize sufficient conditions
such that a classical reduction can be “lifted” to the quantum setting.
We then apply our lifting theorems to post-quantum signature schemes. We are able to show that
the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions and and a more
efficient variant proposed in [BDH11] carry over to the quantum setting. Namely, assuming existence of
(classical) one-way functions that are resistant to efficient quantum inversion algorithms, there exists a
quantum-secure signature scheme. We note that the scheme in [BDH11] is a promising (post-quantum)
candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies it. Actually, to obtain these
results, we formalize a simple criteria, which is motivated by many classical proofs in the literature
and is straightforward to check. This makes our lifting theorem easier to apply, and it should be useful
elsewhere to prove quantum security of proposed post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Finally we
demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that several existing works (Full-Domain hash
in the quantum random-oracle model [Zha12b] and the simple hybrid arguments framework in [HSS11])
can be reformulated under our unified framework.
1 Introduction
Advances in quantum information processing and quantum computing have brought about fundamental chal-
lenges to cryptography. Many classical cryptographic constructions are based on computational problems
that are assumed hard for efficient classical algorithms. However, some of these problems, such as factoring,
discrete-logarithm and Pell’s equation, can be solved efficiently on a quantum computer [Sho97, Hal07]. As
a result, a host of crypto-systems, e.g, the RSA encryption scheme that is deployed widely over the Internet,
are broken by a quantum attacker.
A natural countermeasure is to use quantum-resistant assumptions instead. Namely, one can switch
to other computational problems which appear hard to solve even on quantum computers, and construct
cryptographic schemes based on them. Examples include problems in discrete lattices [MR09, Pei09] and
hard coding problems [Sen11]. We can also make generic assumptions such as the existence of one-way
functions that no efficient quantum algorithms can invert. This leads to the active research area termed
1
post-quantum cryptography [BBD09]. Nonetheless, quantum-resistant assumptions alone do not immedi-
ately imply quantum security of a scheme, due to other fundamental issues that could be subtle and easily
overlooked.
First of all, we sometimes fail to take into account possible attacks unique to a quantum adversary . In
other words, classical definition of security may not capture the right notion of security in the presence of
quantum attackers1 . For example, many signature schemes are designed in the random-oracle (RO) model,
where all users, including the attacker, can query a truly random function. This is meant to capture an
idealized version of a hash function, but in practice everyone instantiate it by him/herself with a concrete
hash function. As a result, when we consider quantum attacks on these schemes, there seems no reason
not to allow a quantum adversary to query the random-oracle in quantum superposition. This leads to the
so called quantum random-oracle model [BDF+11], in which we need to reconsider security definitions (as
well as the analysis consequently) [Zha12b, Zha12a, BZ13].
A more subtle issue concerns security proofs, which may completely fall through in the presence of
quantum attacks. Roughly speaking, one needs to construct a reduction showing that if an efficient attacker
can successfully violate the security requirements of a scheme then there exists an efficient algorithm that
breaks some computational assumption. However, a classical reduction may no longer work (or make sense
at all) against quantum adversaries. A key classical technique, which encounters fundamental difficulty in
the presence of quantum attackers, is called rewinding. Loosely speaking, rewinding arguments consist of a
mental experiment in which an adversary for a scheme is executed multiple times using careful variations on
its input. This usually allows us to gain useful information in order to break the computational assumption.
As first observed by van de Graaf [vdG97], rewinding seems impossible with a quantum adversary since
running it multiple times might modify the entanglement between its internal state and an outside reference
system, thus changing the system’s overall behavior. This issue is most evident in cryptographic protocols
for zero-knowledge proofs and general secure computation. There has been progress in recent years that
develops quantum rewinding techniques in some special cases [Wat09, Unr12], and a few classical protocols
are proven quantum-secure [DL09, LN11, HSS11]. Hallgren et al. [HSS11] also formalized a family of
classical security proofs against efficient adversaries that can be made go through against efficient quantum
adversaries under reasonable computational assumptions. Despite these efforts, however, still not much is
known in general about how to make classical security proofs go through against quantum attackers.
This note revisits these issues for post-quantum cryptography based on computational assumptions, fo-
cusing on simple primitives such as signatures, encryptions and identifications, where constructions and
analysis are usually not too complicated (compared to secure computation protocols for example). In this
setting, the issues we have discussed seem less devastating. For instance, rewinding arguments appear only
occasionally, for example in some lattice-based identification schemes [Lyu08, Lyu09]. Usually rewinding
is not needed for the security proof. Nonetheless, it is still crucial to pinning down proper security defi-
nitions against quantum attacks, as illustrated in the quantum random-oracle example above. In addition,
just because there are no rewinding arguments, does not mean that we can take for granted that the secu-
rity reduction automatically holds against quantum attackers. Very often in the literature of post-quantum
cryptography, a construction based on some quantum-resistant assumption is given together with a security
proof for classical attackers only. The construction is then claimed to be quantum-secure without any further
justification. In our opinion, this is not satisfying and quantum security of these schemes deserves a more
careful treatment.
CONTRIBUTIONS. The main contribution of this note is a general framework to study which classical
security proofs can be restored in the quantum setting. A security proof can be split into (a sequence
of) classical security reductions, and we investigate what reductions are “quantum-friendly”. Recall that
1Although our focus is security against computationally bounded attackers, this issue is also relevant in the statistical setting.
There are classical schemes, which are proven secure against unbounded classical attackers, broken by attackers using quantum
entanglement [CSST11].
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informally a reduction transforms an adversary of one kind to another. We distinguish two cases, game-
preserving and game-updating reductions.
A game-preserving reduction is one such that the transformation still makes sense, i.e., syntacticly well-
defined, for quantum adversaries. In this case we propose the notion of class-respectful reductions which
ensures in addition that the adversary obtained from the transformation indeed works (e.g., it is an efficient
quantum algorithm and successfully solves some problem). Motivated by the structure of security reductions
that occur in many post-quantum cryptographic schemes, we further characterize a simple criteria, which
is straightforward to check. This makes the lifting theorem easier to apply, and should be useful to prove
quantum security for many other schemes not restricted to the applications we show later in this note.
On the other hand, a game-updating reduction captures the case that the classical reduction no longer
makes sense, as illustrated by the quantum random-oracle model. This is usually more difficult to analyze.
We propose translatable reductions, which essentially reduces the problem to the game-preserving case. The
basic idea is to introduce an “interpreter”, so that the classical reduction becomes applicable to a quantum
adversary with the translation by the interpreter. In both cases, we show in our lifting theorems that a
reduction can be constructed in the quantum setting if there is a classical reduction that is respectful or
translatable respectively.
We apply our framework to prove quantum security of some hash-based signature schemes. Specifically,
we show that the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signature schemes from one-way functions
carries over to the quantum setting, assuming the underlying one-way function is quantum-resistant. This
is also true for a more efficient variant proposed in [BDH11] assuming quantum-resistant pesudorandom
functions, which in turn can be based on quantum-resistant one-way functions from known results. This
scheme is a promising (post-quantum) candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies
it. Moreover, we give an alternative proof for the security of a general construction of signatures based
on trapdoor permutations called Full-Domain hash in the quantum random-oracle model. We also show
that an existing framework in the context of cryptographic protocols that characterizes a class of “quantum-
friendly” classical security proofs (simple hybrid augments [HSS11]) fits our framework. These demonstrate
the generality of our framework.
REMARKS. Our framework (e.g., definitions of games and reductions) should look natural to people familiar
with the provable-security paradigm. It should also be straightforward (or even obvious for experts) to ver-
ify the characterizations of “quantum-friendly” reductions in our lifting theorems. The purpose of this note,
however, is to at least make people become more serious and cautious and to encourage further research, in
addition to suggesting one possible formal framework to reason about the security of post-quantum cryp-
tography against quantum attacks. Likewise, it may be just a tedious exercise to work though the classical
proof for hash-based signatures and convince oneself it is indeed quantum-secure. Nonetheless, this can be
done in a more abstract and rigorous way using our framework. We hope that our framework can be applied
elsewhere to analyze quantum security of other post-quantum cryptographic constructions. Ideally, in some
easy cases, it would serve as a tool to automate the routine parts, so that whoever designs a new scheme
should be able to make some simple checks and conclude its quantum security.
OTHER RELATED WORKS. There are a few works that study systematically what classical proofs or state-
ments can be “lifted” to the quantum setting in the context of multi-party secure computation. Unruh
in [Unr10] showed that any classical protocol that is secure in the statistical setting, i.e., against compu-
tationally unbounded adversaries, under a strong universal-composable notion is also statistically secure in
an analogous quantum universal-composable model. Fehr et al. [FKS+13] considered reducibility between
two-party cryptographic tasks in the quantum setting. For example, one can ask if there is a secure protocol
for oblivious transfer assuming two parties can perform bit commitments securely. They showed that in most
cases, the reducibility landscape remains unchanged in the quantum setting under the very same classical
protocols. However, there are cases that classical reducibility no longer holds quantumly, and sometimes
new relations can be established using quantum protocols.
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The formalization of games, reductions and other terms in this note is influenced by a lot of classical
literatures on game-playing proofs [GM84, Yao82, KR01, BR06, Sho05, Hal05]. Recent developments,
especially the framework of code-based game-playing proofs [Hal05, BR06] have motivated automated
tools for proving security [Bla08, BGZB09, Stu09, BGHB11]. Our treatment of computational assumptions
is also inspired by the line of works classifying complexity-theoretic intractability assumptions [Nao03,
HH09, Pas11, GW11].
2 Preliminary
BASIC NOTATIONS. For m ∈ N, [m] denotes the set {1, . . . , m}. We use n ∈ N to denote a security
parameter. The security parameter, represented in unary, is an implicit input to all cryptographic algorithms;
we omit it when it is clear from the context. Quantities derived from protocols or algorithms (probabilities,
running times, etc) should be thought of as functions of n, unless otherwise specified. A function f (n) is said
to be negligible if f = o(n−c) for any constant c, and negl(n) is used to denote an unspecified function that
is negligible in n. We also use poly(n) to denote an unspecified function f (n) = O(nc) for some constant
c. When D is a probability distribution, the notation x ← D indicates that x is a sample drawn according to
D. When D is a finite set, we implicitly associate with it the uniform distribution over the set. If D(·) is a
probabilistic algorithm, D(y) denotes the distribution over the output of D corresponding to input y. We will
sometimes use the same symbol for a random variable and for its probability distribution when the meaning
is clear from the context. Let X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N be two ensembles of binary random
variables. We call X, Y indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y, if |Pr(Xn = 1)− Pr(Yn = 1)| ≤ negl(n).
MACHINE MODELS. We model classical parties as interactive Turing machines, which are probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) by default. Quantum machines are modelled following that of [HSS11]. A quantum
interactive machine (QIM) M is an ensemble of interactive circuits {Mn}n∈N. For each value n of the
security parameter, Mn consists of a sequence of circuits {M
(i)
n }i=1,...,ℓ(n), where M
(i)
n defines the operation
of M in one round i and ℓ(n) is the number of rounds for which Mn operates (we assume for simplicity that
ℓ(n) depends only on n). We omit the scripts when they are clear from the context or are not essential for
the discussion. M (or rather each of the circuits that it comprises) operates on three registers: a state register
S used for input and workspace; an output register O; and a network register N for communicating with
other machines. The size (or running time) t(n) of Mn is the sum of the sizes of the circuits M(i)n . We say
a machine is polynomial time if t(n) = poly(n) and there is a deterministic classical Turing machine that
computes the description of M(i)n in polynomial time on input (1n, 1i). When two QIMs M and M′ interact,
their network register N is shared. The circuits M(i)n and M′(i)n are executed alternately for i = 1, 2, ..., ℓ(n).
When three or more machines interact, the machines may share different parts of their network registers (for
example, a private channel consists of a register shared between only two machines; a broadcast channel
is a register shared by all machines). The order in which machines are activated may be either specified in
advance (as in a synchronous network) or adversarially controlled.
3 Defining Games and Reductions
This section introduces a formal definition of reductions, which captures the type of security reductions that
we care mostly about. It builds upon a basic notion of games.
We use game G to denote a general probabilistic process between two players: the challenger C initiates
the interaction with the other player, call it an adversary A. After several rounds of communication, C
outputs one bit succ or fail indicting success or failure of the game. We define the game value of G with
an adversary A to be the probability that C outputs succ, and denote it ωG(A). Typically in a game G, C
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is efficient, i.e., a poly-time classical or quantum machine. Very often we want to analyze the game when
the adversary is restricted to a class of machines C (e.g., poly-time classical machines). We write G(C) to
indicate this case, and define ωG(C) := max{ωG(A) : A ∈ C}. Sometimes we denote Gˆ to stress a game
defined for quantum machines. We describe below as an example the standard forgery game of existentially
unforgeable signatures under (adaptive) chosen-message-attacks (EU-CMA) [GMR88, KL07].
Existential-Forgery Game GFOR
Signature scheme: Π = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy).
• C generates (pk, sk) ← KGen(1n). Send pk to adversary A.
• A can query signatures on messages {mi}. C returns σi := Sign(sk, mi). These messages can be
chosen adaptively by A.
• A outputs (m∗, σ∗). If Vrfy(pk, (σ∗ , m∗)) = 1 and m∗ /∈ {mi}, C outputs succ. Otherwise output
fail.
There are many variants of this game which will be used later in this note. For example, we denote the
game in which A is allowed to query at most one signature GOT-FOR. GRO-FOR denotes the game where a
random-oracle is available to both parties, and if the random-oracle can be accessed in quantum superposi-
tion we denote the game GQRO-FOR.
We define a reduction R as a 3-tuple (Gext, T , Gint). There are an external (explicit) game Gext and
an internal (implicit) game Gint, and an additional party T called the transformer. Loosely speaking, T
transforms an adversary A in Gint to an adversary in Gext. Specifically, T takes an adversary’s machine A
as input and outputs the description of an adversary in Gext. We distinguish black-box and non-black-box
reductions, with a focus on black-box reductions. In a black-box reduction, A is provided as a black-
box, which means that the transformation does not look into the codes and inner workings of the adversary.
Whereas in a non-black-box reduction, R has the explicit description ofA. We denote T (A) as the resulting
adversary in Gext that is “transformed” from A by T . In the black-box setting, the output of T will always
be of the form TA, i.e., an oracle machine with access toA. Note that T is the same for allA, and it emulates
an execution of Gint with A. However, in general T needs not to run the game as in a real interaction. For
instance, it can stop in the middle of the game and start over (i.e., rewind).
PROPERTIES OF A REDUCTION. To make a reduction meaningful, we describe below a few properties that
we may want a reduction to hold. Let A and B be two classes of machines.
• A-compatible reductions. We say R is A-compatible, if ∀A ∈ A, Gint(A) and Gext(T (A)) are well
defined. Namely A and T (A) respect the specifications of the games.
• (A,B)-consistent reductions. We say R is (A,B)-consistent, if R is A-compatible and ∀A ∈ A,
T (A) ∈ B. When we write a reduction as (Gext(B), T , Gint(A)) orR(A,B) in short, the reduction
is assumed to be (A,B)-consistent. Note that if R is black-box, it must hold that TA ⊆ B.
• Value-dominating. We say R is value-dominating if ωGext(T (A)) = ωGext(T (B)) whenever
ωGint(A) = ωGint(B).
• (αsucc,A)-effective reductions. Let αsucc : R+ → R+ be some function. We say R is αsucc-effective
onA if ωGext(T (A)) ≥ αsucc(ωGint(A)). If this holds for any A ∈ A, we callR (αsucc,A)-effective
• (αtime,A)-efficient reductions. Let αtime : R+ → R+ be some function. We say R is αtime-efficient
if TIME(T (A)) ≤ αtime(TIME(A)) for any A ∈ A.
Effective and efficient reductions are often used in combination, especially when we are concerned with
tightness of a reduction. In that case, αsucc and αtime may depend on both TIME(A) and ωGint(A). This
paper will focus on effectiveness only. We often abuse notation and use αsucc as a scalar if this causes no
confusion. We stress that these properties talk about the output machine of T on A (e.g., T (A) lies in
a specific class, or it runs in time comparable to that of A), however we do not restrict the computational
power of T , though it is typically efficient. The reason is that for our purpose, we only need to show
existence of an adversary for Gext with nice properties.
4 Quantum-Friendly Security Reductions: A General Framework
In this section, we attempt to propose a general framework to study which classical proofs still hold when
the adversaries become quantum. Consider a classical cryptographic scheme Π. To analyze its security
against efficient classical attacks (in the provable-security paradigm), one typically proceeds as follows:
1. Formalizing some security requirement by a game Gint. Typically we are concerned about security
against a particular class of attackers (e.g., PPT machines), so we restrict the game Gint to a class A.
We also associate a value εA ∈ (0, 1] with the game, which upper bounds the success probability that
any adversary in A wins the game. Namely we require that ωGint(A) ≤ εA. We denote this security
requirement as (Gint(A), εA)2.
2. Formalizing some computational assumption by another game Gext. Similarly the assumption is
assumed to hold against a specific class of machines, so we restrict the game to a class B, and require
that ωGext(B) ≤ εB ∈ (0, 1]. Denote the computational assumption as (Gext(B), εB).
3. Constructing an (A,B)-consistent reduction R = (Gext(B), T , Gint(A)). Security follows if the
reduction is in addition αsucc-effective with αsucc ≥ εB/εA. This implies if there exists an A ∈ A
with ωGint(A) > εA (i.e.. A breaks the security requirement), there is an adversary T (A) ∈ B such
that ωGext(T (A)) ≥ αsucc ·ωGint(A) > εB (i.e., it breaks the computational assumption).
Now we want to know if the classical security reductions are “quantum-friendly” so that we can claim
that the scheme is secure against quantum attacks. We need to reconsider each step of the classical analysis
in the quantum setting (See Table 1 for a comparison between classical provable-security and quantum
provable-security for a scheme.). Let (Aˆ, Bˆ) be two classes of quantum machines. We adapt Gint and define
(Gˆint(Aˆ), ε
Aˆ
). It is supposed to capture some security requirement against quantum attackers in Aˆ, and we
require that ωGˆint(Aˆ) ≤ εAˆ. Likewise, we adapt Gext to a game Gˆext, which should formalize a reasonable
computational assumption (Gˆext(Bˆ), ε
Bˆ
) against quantum adversaries. Then we can ask the fundamental
question (still informal):
Can we “lift” R to the quantum setting?
Namely, is there a reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) that preserves similar properties as R(A,B)?
To answer this question, we distinguish two cases. In the simpler case, Gˆ are syntactically identical to
G. Namely, Gˆext(Bˆ) (resp. Gˆint(Aˆ)) is just Gext (resp. Gint) restricted to the quantum class Bˆ (resp. Aˆ). In
particular, this means that Gext and Gint are still the right games that capture a computational assumption and
some security requirement. We call this case game-preserving. In contrast, as illustrated by the quantum
random-oracle example, Gˆ may change and this leads to a more complicated case to analyze. We call it
game-updating. In the following subsections, we investigate in each case what reductions can be lifted to
the quantum setting, and hence are quantum-friendly.
2Sometime we write (Gint(A), εA)Π to emphasize the specific scheme we are dealing with, though it is usually clear from the
context.
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Table 1: Components of classical and quantum provable-security for a classical construction.
Classical Provable-Security Quantum Provable-Security
Security Requirement (Gint(A), εA) (Gˆint(Aˆ), εAˆ)
Computational Assumption (Gext(B), εB) (Gˆext(Bˆ), εBˆ)
Reduction R(A,B) ?−→ Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ)
4.1 Lifting Game-Preserving Reductions
Let R(A,B) = (Gext(B), T , Gint(A)) be a classical reduction. Let Gˆext(Bˆ) and Gˆint(Aˆ) be extended
games in the quantum setting that are restricted to classes of quantum machines Bˆ and Aˆ. We consider
the case that Gˆ and G are the same in this section. We want to know if there is a reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) that
preserves nice properties of R. Since we are dealing with the same games applied to different classes of
machines, one may expect that simple tweaks on R should work. This intuition is indeed true to some
extend, which we formalize next.
Definition 4.1 (G-equivalent machines). Two machines M and N are called G-equivalent if ωG(M) ≡
ωG(N).
Definition 4.2 ([G,C]-realizable classical machines). A classical machine M is called [G,C]-realizable, if
there is a machine N ∈ C s.t. ωG(M) = ωG(N). We denote EG(C) as the collection of classical machines
that are [G,C]-realizable.
We put forward class-respectful reductions as a template for quantum-friendly reductions in the game-
reserving case.
Definition 4.3 (β-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-respectful reductions). Let R be a classical reduction
(Gext(B), T , Gint(A)). We say R is β-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-respectful for some β ∈ R+ if the following hold:
1. (β, Aˆ)-extendable: R is EGint(Aˆ)-compatible and (β, EGint(Aˆ))-effective. That is, ∀A ∈ EGint(Aˆ),
Gext(T (A)) and Gint(A) are well-defined3, and ωGext(T (A)) ≥ β(ωGint(A)).
2. (Aˆ, Bˆ)-closed: R is (EGint(Aˆ), EGext(Bˆ))-consistent. Namely, ∀A ∈ EGint(Aˆ), T (A) ∈ EGext(Bˆ).
The theorem below follows (almost) immediately from this definition.
Theorem 4.4 (Quantum lifting for game-preserving reductions). If R(A,B) is β-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-respectful, then
there exists an (Aˆ, Bˆ)-consistent reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) :=
(Gext(Bˆ), Tˆ , Gint(Aˆ)) that is (β, Aˆ)-effective.
Proof. Consider any Aˆ ∈ Aˆ. Let A be a classical machine such that A is Gext-equivalent to Aˆ. Since R is
(Aˆ, Bˆ)-closed, we know that T (A) ∈ EGext(Bˆ) and hence there is a machine NAˆ ∈ Bˆ s.t. ωGint(NAˆ) =
ωGint(T (A)). Define Tˆ to be a quantum machine such that, given Aˆ ∈ Aˆ, outputs NAˆ. Namely Tˆ (Aˆ) :=
NAˆ. Let Rˆ := (G
ext(Bˆ), Tˆ , Gint(Aˆ)). Clearly Rˆ is (Aˆ, Bˆ)-consistent due to the way we defined Tˆ . It is
also (β, Aˆ)-effective because ωGext(Tˆ (Aˆ)) = ωGext(T (A)) ≥ β(ωGint(A)) = β(ωGint(Aˆ)).
3Most classical games we deal with are actually well-defined for all machines. But we explicitly state this requirement in case
of some artificial examples.
7
To apply the theorem, we need to check the two conditions of respectful reductions. The “extendability”
condition is usually easy to verify. However, the “closure” property can be challenging and subtle, depending
on the classes of players we care about. We will be mostly interested in poly-time machines. Namely let
A = B be poly-time classical machines and Aˆ = Bˆ be the collection of poly-time quantum machines,
denote it by Q. In this case, we propose a simple criteria that is easy to check in existing classical security
reductions. When combined with a few other easily verifiable conditions, we can show class-respectful
reductions. This in a way justifies a common belief that most post-quantum schemes are indeed quantum-
secure, due to some simple form in their classical security reductions which seem “quantum-friendly”.
Let R = (Gext, T , Gint) be a classical black-box reduction. We say that R is straight-line if the output
machine of T on A, which as before is denoted TA, runs A in straight-line till completion. Namely, other
than the flexibility of choosing A’s random tape, T behaves exactly like a honest challenger in Gint when it
invokes A. This type of reduction, due to its simple structure, is amenable to getting lifted.
Theorem 4.5 (Straight-line reduction: a useful condition for class-closure). LetR = (Gext(B), T , Gint(A))
be a classical reduction with A and B both being classical poly-time machines. Let Aˆ = Bˆ be quantum
poly-time machines. If R is black-box straight-line, Aˆ-compatible and value-dominating, then R is (Aˆ, Bˆ)-
closed.
Proof. For any A ∈ EGint(Aˆ), let Aˆ ∈ Aˆ be such that A and Aˆ are Gint-equivalent. We argue that TA
and TAˆ are Gext-equivalent and hence TA ∈ EGext(Bˆ). Since A and Aˆ are Gint-equivalent and R is value-
dominating, ωGext(TAˆ) = ωGext(TA). TAˆ ∈ Bˆ, i.e., it is quantum poly-time, since T is classical poly-time,
and runs any oracle in straight-line. Finally, note that we need the compatibility condition so that all objects
above are well-defined.
Combine the extendibility condition, we get the corollary below from Theorem 4.4.
Corollary 4.6. Let R be a classical black-box reduction for classical poly-time players. Let Aˆ = Bˆ be
quantum poly-time machines. If R is (β, Aˆ)-extendible, straight-line, and value-dominating, then R is
β-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-respectful. As a consequence, there is a reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) that is (β, Aˆ)-effective.
Note that in this scenario, Rˆ is also straight-line and Tˆ (Aˆ) = TAˆ. Loosely speaking, the very same
reduction carries over to the quantum setting.
4.2 Lifting Game-Updating Reductions
Sometimes we need to update Gˆext or Gˆint or both, in order to capture the right computational assumption
and the security property against quantum players. In this case, the classical transformation procedure may
become totally inappropriate and give little clue about how to restore a quantum reduction (if there exists
one).
We view this issue as a matter of “language-barrier”. One way to establish a reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) is to
introduce an interpreter Iˆ that translates the “languages” between the players in the original (classical) and
updated (quantum) games. Namely, Iˆ translates an adversary Aˆ in Gˆint to an adversary Aˆ′ in the classical
game Gint. Then we can reduce the issue to the game-preserving case and consider a class of quantum
adversaries Aˆ′ := Iˆ(Aˆ). Suppose we can lift the classical reduction to work with adversaries in Aˆ′, then
we end up with a quantum adversary in game Gext. Next, by the same token, Iˆ translates the adversary
into a quantum one compatible in Gˆext. This procedure gives a quantum transformer Tˆ := Iˆ ◦ Tˆ0 ◦ Iˆ that
operates as follows
Aˆ ∈ Aˆ
Iˆ
−→ Aˆ′
Tˆ0−→ Tˆ0(Aˆ
′)
Iˆ
−→ Bˆ ∈ Bˆ .
We formalize this idea, and propose class-translatable reductions as a template for quantum-friendly
reductions in the game-updating case. For simplicity, we assume only Gint is updated to Gˆint and Gext stays
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the same. We want to investigate if a reduction of the form (Gext(Bˆ), Tˆ , Gˆint(Aˆ)) can be derived. It is
straightforward to adapt the treatment to the scenario where Gext (or both) gets updated.
Definition 4.7 ((β, β′)-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-translatable reductions). LetR be a classical reduction (Gext(B), T , Gint(A))
and β, β′ be two functions. Let Gˆint be a quantum game, and (Aˆ, Bˆ) be classes of quantum machines. We
say R is (β, β′)-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-translatable, if there exists a machine (i.e. Interpreter) Iˆ , such that the following
hold:
• R is β-(Bˆ, Aˆ′)-respectful, where Aˆ′ := Iˆ(Aˆ).
• (Gint, Iˆ , Gˆint) is a (β′, Aˆ)-effective reduction. Namely ∀Aˆ ∈ Aˆ, ωGint(Iˆ(Aˆ)) ≥ β′(ωGˆint(Aˆ)).
Theorem 4.8 (Quantum lifting for game-updating reductions). If R(A,B) is (β, β′)-(Aˆ, Bˆ)-translatable,
then there exists an (Aˆ, Bˆ)-consistent reduction Rˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ) := (Gext(Bˆ), Tˆ , Gˆint(Aˆ)) that is (β · β′, Aˆ)-
effective.
Proof. By the hypothesis, we know there is an interpreter Iˆ . Since R is β-(Bˆ, Aˆ′)-respectful, by Theo-
rem 4.4, there is a Tˆ0 s.t. (Gext(Bˆ), Tˆ0, Gint(Aˆ′)) is (β, Aˆ′)-effective. Define Tˆ := Tˆ0 ◦ Iˆ and Rˆ :=
(Gext, Tˆ , Gˆint). Clearly, Rˆ is (Aˆ, Bˆ)-consistent because for any Aˆ ∈ Aˆ, Tˆ (Aˆ) = Tˆ0(Iˆ(Aˆ)) ∈ Bˆ. On the
other hand, for any Aˆ ∈ Aˆ it holds that ωGext(Tˆ (Aˆ)) ≥ β · ωGint(Iˆ(Aˆ)) ≥ ββ′ ·ωGˆint(Aˆ).
In contrast to the game-preserving setting, applying lifting theorem for game-updating reductions typ-
ically needs non-trivial extra work. The main difficulty comes from showing existence of an interpreter Iˆ
with the desired properties. In Sect. 5.2, we give an example that demonstrates potential applications of
Theorem 4.8.
5 Applications
We give a few examples to demonstrate our framework for “quantum-friendly” reductions. In the game-
preserving setting (Section 5.1), we show two versions of quantum-secure hash-based signatures schemes
assuming quantum-resistant one-way functions. One follows the generic construction that builds upon Lam-
port’s OTS and Merkle’s original hash-tree idea. The other is an efficient variant proposed in [BDH11] that
uses a more compact one-time signature scheme and a more sophisticated tree structure. In the game-
updating setting (Section 5.2), we give an alternative proof for Full-Domain Hash (FDH) in the Quantum
RO model as shown in [Zha12b]. We stress that this proof is meant to illustrate how our lifting theorem
can be potentially applied, as apposed to providing new technical insights. Unless otherwise specified, all
players are either classical or quantum poly-time machines.
5.1 Quantum Security for Hash-based Signatures
Classically, there are generic constructions (and efficient variants) for EU-CMA-secure signature schemes
based on one-way functions. We show that security reductions there can be lifted easily, using our class-
respecful characterization. It follows that there are classical signature schemes that are secure against quan-
tum attacks, merely assuming existence of quantum-resistant one-way functions.
5.1.1 Generic hash-tree signature schemes
A generic approach for constructing EU-CMA-secure signature scheme from OWFS goes as follows:
• A one-time signature (OTS) is constructed based on OWFS. There are various ways to achieve it. We
consider Lamport’s construction (L-OTS) here [Lam79].
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• A family of universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFS) is constructed based on OWFS. This was
shown by Rompel [Rom90] and we denote the hash family R-H.
• An OTS scheme is converted to a full-fledged (stateful) signature scheme using UOWHFS. The con-
version we consider here is essentially Merkle’s original hash-tree construction [Mer90].
We show next that each step can be “lifted” to the quantum setting using our lifting theorem for game-
preserving reductions (Theorem 4.4) and the straight-line characterization (Theorem 4.5). Note that we do
not intend to optimize the construction here. For instance, one can use a pseudorandom function to make the
signature scheme stateless. Verifying whether these still hold in the quantum setting is left as future work,
though we believe it is the case, following the framework and tools we have developed.
LAMPORT’S OTS. Consider the (classical) reduction R := (GINV, T , GOT-FOR), where GINV is the inversion
game and GOT-FOR is the one-time forgery game. It is straight-line and value-dominating. Both games are
compatible with Q and ωGext(TA) ≥ β · ωGint(A) for any A with β(x) = 12ℓ(n)x and ℓ(n) a polynomial
representing the length of the messages. Hence R is (β,Q)-effective as well. Thus we claim that:
Proposition 5.1. (GINV, εQ = negl(n))OWF implies (GOT-FOR, εQ = negl(n))L-OTS. Namely, assuming
quantum-resistant OWFS, there exists EU-CMA-secure OTS against quantum attackers Q.
UOWHFS FROM OWFS. Rompel’s construction is complicated and the proof is technical (or rather tedious).
However, the key ingredients in which security reductions are crucial are actually not hard to check. Basi-
cally, there are four major components in the construction:
1. From a given OWF f 0, construct another OWF f with certain structure. Basically, f is more “balanced”
in the sense that sampling a random element in the range of f and then sub-sampling its pre-images
is not much different from sampling a random element in the domain directly.
2. From f , construct H = {hs} such that for any x, it is hard to find a collision in the so called “hard-
sibling” set. The hard-sibling set should comprise a noticeable fraction of all possible collisions.
3. Amplifying the hard-sibling set so that finding any collision of a pre-determined x is hard.
4. Final refinements such as making the hash functions compressing.
The second step is the crux of the entire construction. There are three reductions showing that finding a
hard-sibling is as hard as inverting f which we will discuss in a bit detail below, whereas showing that the
hard-sibling set is noticeably large is done by a probabilistic analysis and holds information-theoretically.
Other steps either do not involve a security reduction and relies purely on some probabilistic analysis, or the
reductions are clearly liftable.
The three reduction in step 2 involve four games: GINV–the standard inversion game for OWFS; GINV’–a
variant of GINV in which y is sampled according to another distribution, as opposed to sampling a domain
element x uniformly at random and setting y := f (x); GCOL’, a variant of the collision game for UOWHFS,
in which an adversary is supposed to find a collision x′ in a special set (we don’t specify it here); and
GCOL”, which further modifies GCOL’ in the distribution that s is sampled (instead of uniformly at random).
Then R1 = (GINV, T1, GINV’), R2 := (GINV’, T2, GCOL”) and R3 = (GCOL”, T3, GCOL’) are constructed.
R1 and R3 essentially follow from the “balanced” structure of f , and R2 comes from the construction of
H = {hs}. All three reductions are black-box straight-line, value-dominating, and (βi,Q)-effective with
βi ≥ 1/pi(n) for some polynomial pi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For concreteness, we can set p1 = ℓ′(n)–the length
of the input string of f 0, p2 = 3 a constant, and p3(n) = 5ℓ′(n) + log ℓ′(n) + 2. Our exposition here and
parameter choices are adapted from [KK05].
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Proposition 5.2. (GINV, εQ = negl(n))OWF implies (GCOL, εQ = negl(n))R-H. Namely, assuming quantum-
resistant OWFS, there exist UOWHFS secure against quantum attackers Q.
HASH-TREE: CONVERTING OTS TO FULL-FLEDGED SIGNATURES. Once a family of UOWHFS and an OTS
are at hand, we can get a full-fledged signature scheme based on Merkle’s hash-tree construction. Basically,
one constructs a depth-k binary tree and each leaf corresponds to a message. Each node in the tree is
associated with a key-pair (pkw, skw) of the OTS scheme. The signature of a message m consists of σm :=
Sign(skm, m) and an authentication chain. For each node w along the path from the root to the message, we
apply H = {hs} to the concatenation of its children’s public keys and then sign the resulting string with its
secret key skw. The authentication chain contains all these (pkw0, pkw1, σw := Sign(skw, pkw0‖pkw1)). Let
M-TREE be the resulting tree-based scheme and GFOR be the forgery game. The classical security analysis
builds upon two reductions (GCOL, T , GFOR) and (GOT-FOR, T ′, GFOR). It is easy to check that both satisfy
the conditions in Corollary 4.6.
Proposition 5.3. (GCOL, εQ = negl(n))UOWHFS and (GOT-FOR, εQ = negl(n))OTS imply (GFOR, εQ =
negl(n))M-TREE. Namely, assuming quantum-resistant UOWHFS and OTS, there exist an EU-CMA-secure
signature scheme against quantum attackers Q.
Combining Propositions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, we get
Theorem 5.4. Assuming quantum-resistant OWFS, there exists EU-CMA-secure signature schemes against
quantum poly-time attackers Q.
5.1.2 XMSS: an efficient variant
The XMSS scheme [BDH11] can be seen an efficient instantiation of the generic construction above. It uses
a different one-time signature scheme called Winternitz-OTS (W-OTS for short), which can be based on a
family of pseudorandom functions, which in turn exists from the “minimal” assumption that OWFS exist.
The hash-tree (which is called XMSS-tree in [BDH11]) also differs slightly. We now show that both the
security of W-OTS and the conversion by XMSS-tree are still valid against quantum adversaries.
QUANTUM SECURITY OF W-OTS. Classically, existence of OWF imply the EU-CMA-security of W-OTS.
This is established in three steps: 1) By standard constructions, a pseudorandom generator (PRG) can be
constructed from OWFS [HILL99], and then one can construct a pseudo-random function (PRF) from a
PRG [GGM86]. 2) A PRF is shown to be also key-one-way (KOW, defined later). 3) Show that KOW implies
EU-CMA-security of W-OTS by a reduction.
The first step is known to be true in the presence of quantum adversaries [Zha12a]4. Informally the
game for KOW of a function family F goes as follows: C samples a random function fk ∈R F and a random
element x in the domain. (x, y := fk(x)) is sent to an adversary A, who tries to find k′ such that fk′(x) = y.
The PRF to KOW reduction is straight-line and value-dominating. Extendibility is trivial. Therefore it is Q-
respectful. This is also the case in the KOW to EU-CMA-security of W-OTS reduction. In addition β is 1 for
both reductions, which means that the effectiveness (i.e., tightness in terms of success probability) in the
classical analysis carries over unchanged to the quantum setting.
Proposition 5.5. (GPRF, εQ = negl(n)) implies (GOT-FOR, εQ = negl(n))W-OTS. Namely, assuming a
quantum-resistant PRF, W-OTS is one-time EU-CMA-secure against quantum attackers Q.
4It is easy to verify that the security reduction from PRG to PRF in GMM construction is quantum friendly. The security analysis
in the HILL PRF construction from OWFS is much more complicated. To the best of our knowledge, no rigorous argument has
appeared in the literature. It would be a nice exercise to apply our framework and give a formal proof.
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XMSS-TREE. The XMSS-tree modifies Merkle’s hash-tree construction with an XOR-technique. Loosely
speaking, each level of the tree is associated with two random strings, which mask the two children nodes
before we apply the hash function to produce an authentication of a node. This tweak allows one to use
a second-preimage resistant (SPR) hash function, instead of collision-resistant hash functions or UOWHFS.
Theoretically universal one-way implies second-preimage resistance. But in practice people typically test
second-preimage resistance when a hash function is designed. Despite this change, the security proof is
not much different. Reductions are given that convert a forger either to a forger for W-OTS or to an adver-
sary that breaks SPR-hash functions. They are straight-line, value-dominating and (1,Q)-extendible. By
Corollary 4.6, we have
Proposition 5.6. (GSPR, εQ = negl(n)) and (GOT-FOR, εQ = negl(n))W-OTS imply
(GFOR, εQ = negl(n))XMSS. Namely, assuming quantum-resistant PRF and SPR hash functions, XMSS
signature is EU-CMA-secure against quantum attackers Q.
As mentioned above, UOWHFS are by definition second-preimage resistant. As a result, quantum-
resistant SPR hash functions can be constructed from quantum-resistant OWFS as well. Thus, we obtain that
the XMSS signature scheme is EU-CMA-secure against efficient quantum attackers Q, assuming quantum-
resistant OWFS.
5.2 Full-Domain Hash in Quantum Random-Oracle Model
Full domain hash (FDH) is a generic approach of constructing signature schemes based on trapdoor permu-
tations (TDPs) in the RO model [BR93]. The classical proof cleverly “programs” the random-oracle, so that
a challenge of inverting a TDP gets embedded as one output value of the random-oracle. However when
we consider FDH in the quantum random-oracle (QRO) model, in which one can query the random-oracle
in superposition, we lose the “programable” ability in the proof. Zhandry [Zha12b] resolved this issue by
some quantum “programing” strategy, which built upon lower bounds on quantum query complexity. This
is summarized as follows.
Theorem 5.7 ([Zha12b, Theorem 5.3]). Let F be a quantum-resistant trapdoor permutation. If we model H
as a quantum random-oracle, then Π is quantum EU-CMA-secure.
We note that Zhandry’s proof fits our framework for lifting game-updating reductions. Namely, let GTDP
the inversion game for a TDP. We can construct an interpreter Iˆ for any adversary in the forgery game
GQRO-FOR, and show that the classical reduction (GTDP, T , GRO-FOR) is translatable. Applying Theorem 4.8
proves the theorem here. We describe a proof in Appendix A for completeness. This illustrates how to apply
our framework and get (in our opinion) more modular security analysis.
5.3 Quantum Security of Classical Cryptographic Protocols
So far, we have been focusing on basic cryptographic primitives such as UOWHFS and signatures. However,
our framework is not limited to these scenarios, and actually can be applied to analyzing more complicated
cryptographic protocols as well. Specifically an abstraction called simple-hybrid arguments, which charac-
terize a family of classical proofs for two-party secure computation protocols in the computational setting
that go through against quantum adversaries [HSS11], can be derived easily in our framework. We defer the
details in Appendix B.
6 Discussions
We have proposed a general framework to study which security reductions are quantum-friendly. The lifting
theorems we developed can be used to analyze security against computationally bounded quantum adver-
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saries for post-quantum cryptography. As an application, we have shown the quantum security of a generic
hash-tree based signature scheme and an efficient variant (which is a promising candidate for post-quantum
signature schemes to be implemented in practice).
However, this note concerns mostly the feasibility of lifting classical security proofs to the quantum
setting, and there are many important aspects missing and many interesting directions to be investigated.
For example, we did not consider much about the “quality” of the resulting proofs for quantum adversaries.
Say, can we preserve the tightness of the classical reduction when we lift it? Tightness of security reduc-
tion is of great practical impact. Not only it affects how to set the parameters in implementations, it may
render security meaningless in some cases [CMS12]. Interestingly, there are also examples where we get
tighter reduction in the quantum setting, as demonstrated in the quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem [AC02].
This is also a nice example of game-updating reductions beyond the QRO model. Along the same line,
another game-updating reduction that is fundamental in cryptography arises from constructing a pseudoran-
dom permutation (PRP) from a pseudorandom function (PRF). It is not clear if the classical construction
remains valid if the game defining PRP allows superposition queries to distinguish it from a truly random
permutation.
There are many concrete questions left for quantum-secure signature schemes as well. We showed a
quantum EU-CMA-secure signature scheme based on quantum-resistant OWFS. Can we make it strongly-
unforgeable? The XMSS scheme is also known to be forward-secure. Is it still true against quantum adver-
saries? We believe both answers are positive, by similar analysis from this note. Moreover, there are generic
transformations that augments a signature scheme with stronger security guarantees (e.g., from EU-CMA-
secure to SU-CMA-secure). Do they hold in the quantum setting? We also note that the applications we have
shown in the game-updating case are not very exciting in the sense that designing an interpreter appears no
easier than coming up with a quantum reduction directly. It is helpful to further explore along this line to
find more interesting applications.
Finally, we remark that quantum attacks could reduce the security level of a system, using for example
Grover’s quantum search algorithm. Although not covered in this note, this issue needs to be addressed with
care as well.
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A (Alternative) Proof of Theorem 5.7: FDH in QRO
We first review a technical tool in [Zha12b] called semi-constant distribution. Loosely speaking, it allows
us to “program” a function, which still looks like a random function even to a quantum observer.
Definition A.1 (Semi-Constant Distribution [Zha12b, Definition 4.1]). Let X and Y be sets and denote HX,Y
the set of functions from X to Y. The semi-constant distribution SCλ is defined as the distribution overHX,Y
resulting from the following process:
• Pick a random element y from Y.
• For each x ∈ X, set H(x) = y wth probability λ. Otherwise set H(x) to be a random element in Y.
Theorem A.2 ( [Zha12b, Corollary 4.3]). The distribution of the output of a quantum algorithm making qH
queries to an oracle drawn from SCλ is at most a distance 83 q4Hλ2 away from the case when the oracle is
drawn uniformly from HX,Y.
We are now ready to give a proof for Theorem 5.7 using our framework for game-updating reductions.
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Proof. Classically there is R = (GTDP, T , GRO-FOR) that inverts the TDP with a forger for the FDH-Sign
scheme. We construct an interpreter Iˆ as follows (Fig. 1), and show that R is (Aˆ, Bˆ)-translatable with
Aˆ = Bˆ = Q.
Clearly, Aˆ′ is a well-defined (quantum) adversary for the original forgery game GRO-FOR (i.e., the hash
queries are classical). If Aˆ outputs a valid forgery (m∗, σ∗) such that Hˆ(m∗) = fpk(σ∗) and O2(m∗) =
1, we know that Hˆ(m∗) = b = H(a) and hence (a, σ∗) forms a valid forgery in the classical forgery
game. Note that the view of Aˆ in Aˆ′ differs from a true interaction with a challenger in game GQRO-FOR
in two places: a truly random oracle is replaced by Hˆ drawn from SCλ and the signing query fails with
probability λ. By picking λ a proper inverse polynomial in qH and qS, we can obtain from Theorem A.2
that ωGRO-FOR (Iˆ(Aˆ)) ≥ ω2GQRO-FOR (Aˆ)/p(n) for some polynomial p(·). Thus (GRO-FOR, Iˆ , GQRO-FOR) forms
a (β′,Q)-effective reduction for a suitable β′. Since the two random oracles (O1,O2) can be simulated
efficiently by k-wise indecent functions (C.f. [Zha12b, Theorem 6.1]), R is clearly β-(Q, Iˆ (Q))-respectful
with β = 1. Therefore we obtain that R is (Q,Q)-translatable, which by Theorem 4.8 can be lifted to a
reduction (GTDP(Q), Tˆ , GQRO-FOR(Q)). This shows that the FDH-Signature scheme is quantum EU-CMA-
secure, assuming quantum-resistant trapdoor permutations.
Interpreter Iˆ
Input: Adversary Aˆ for a quantum EU-CMA-game. Let qS and aH be upper bounds on the number of
signing queries and hash queries of Aˆ.
Output: An adversary Aˆ′ := Iˆ(Aˆ) that operates as follows:
1. Receive pk from a challenger, which indexes a permeation fpk.
2. Pick an arbitrary message a. Query H(·) and get b := H(a).
3. Emulate (internally) a quantum EU-CMA-game with Aˆ.
• Use b to create an oracle Hˆ from a semi-constant distribution SCλ which handles (quantum)
hash queries from Aˆ. Specifically, let O2 be a random oracle outputting 1 with probability
λ and O1 be a random oracle mapping a message to an input of fpk. Let Hˆ(x) = b if
O2(x) = 1 and Hˆ(x) = fpk(O1(x)) otherwise.
• On signing query mi, if O2(mi) = 1 abort. Otherwise respond with σi := O1(mi).
4. On output (m∗, σ∗) from Aˆ, if O2(m∗) = 1 output (a, σ∗).
Figure 1: Construction of the Interpreter.
B Details on Sect. 5.3
Security definitions in this setting usually follows the simulation paradigm. In particular, there is not a
simple game capturing them5. Roughly speaking, we require the existence of an imaginary entity (called
the simulator) with certain properties for any possible adversary. The main ingredient of a security proof is
often a hybrid argument, in which a sequence of imaginary experiments (a.k.a. hybrids) are defined in terms
of an adversary and the simulator. The goal is to show each adjacent pair of hybrids is indistinguishable.
Whenever this is done by a reduction of breaking a computational assumption, we can define a distinguishing
game (as our internal game) and study if the reduction can be lifted using our framework.
5In some sense, the security definitions we discussed earlier that are specified by games are falsifiable, which does not seem to
be so here.
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Consider zero-knowledge proof protocols as a concrete example. Zero-knowledge property requires
that for any dishonest verifier V∗, there is a simulator S , such that the output of S is indistinguishable from
the view of V∗ in real protocol with honest prover. At this moment, it looks quite alien to our framework.
However, once we start the security proof, it naturally fits our framework. Basically, if we fix a dishonest
V∗, and a specific construction of a simulator, showing that the simulator works can be thought of as a
distinguishing game.
ZK Distinguishing Game GZKV∗ ,S
Two parties: Challenger C and distiguisher D.
• C flips a random coin b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0 simulates an execution of the ZK protocol and sends
D the view of V∗. If b = 1, run the simulator S and sends D the output of S .
• D receives the message from C, generate one bit b′ and send it to C.
• C outputs succ if b = b′ and fail otherwise.
The security proof will then proceed in the familiar fashion. Namely a reduction (Gext, T , Gint :=
GZKV∗ ,S) is constructed for some computational assumption captured by Gext. We can then ask if we can
“lift” the reduction to the quantum setting. One subtlety, however, is that the distinguishing game is specific
to V∗ and S . Because of issues like rewinding, we have to update the games. The challenge then lies in
constructing a simulator Sˆ for any dishonest quantum verifier Vˆ∗, which gives the updated distinguishing
game GˆZK
Vˆ∗ ,Sˆ
in the presence of quantum verifiers.
Sometimes we end up in the simpler game-preserving case. A concrete example is an abstraction pro-
posed in [HSS11], called simple-hybrid arguments (SHA).
SIMPLE HYBRID ARGUMENTS. SHA formalizes a family of classical proofs that can go through against
quantum adversaries in the computational UC model. The essence is a simple observation: if two adjacent
hybrids only differs by a small change such as chaining the plaintext of an encryption, then quantum se-
curity immediately follows as long as computational assumptions are made quantum-resistant. Using our
framework, each adjacent pair of hybrid induce a distinguishing game Gint that can be defined similarly to
GZKV∗ ,S , and a classical reduction R := (Gext, T , Gint) is already at hand for some computational assump-
tion defined by Gext. The conditions in SHA, e.g., changing only the plaintext, ensure that R satisfy the
definition of (Aˆ, Bˆ)-respectful reductions with Aˆ = Bˆ = Q. As a result, these reductions can be lifted by
Theorem 4.4.
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